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Abstract 
The potential for development and deployment of trusted 
health information systems (HIS) based upon intrinsically 
more secure computer system architectures than those in 
general use, as commodity level systems, in today's 
marketplace is investigated in this paper.  A proposal is 
made for a viable, trusted architecture for HIS, entitled 
the “Open Trusted Health Informatics Structure 
(OTHIS)”, based upon a set of separate but connected 
trusted modules.  OTHIS addresses privacy and security 
requirements at all levels in an HIS.   In this paper, we are 
concerned with the role of trustworthy access control 
mechanisms in HIS architectures.  Our proposed OTHIS 
architecture gives direction on how trustworthiness in HIS 
can be achieved.   
Keywords: information assurance, security for health 
systems, access control, mandatory access control, trusted 
systems, information security and privacy1 
1 Introduction 
Graauw (2005) clearly set the scene for the emergence of 
Web Services oriented implementation of next generation 
health information systems. While coordination of data 
exchange must play a vital role in any national electronic 
health record scheme, the overall information assurance 
of the system cannot be left to the associated messaging 
system alone.  For example, Graauw emphasizes that “... 
all messages are exchanged between a provider HIS and 
a healthcare information broker (HIB), which in turn may 
send the data contained in those messages to other 
healthcare parties.”  The importance of the assurance of 
all intermediary computer systems and associated 
databases cannot be underestimated as these may quickly 
become the “weakest link”.  The paper clearly 
acknowledges this in the following statement in its 
conclusion: “It is possible to build a reliable and secure 
framework for sending medical data over the Internet … 
provided all transport nodes are reliable.”  This 
provision appears to be noted in much of the research 
conducted to date which is based around the assured 
transportation of electronic medical records.  This places 
great emphasis again on the need for high trust computer 
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systems to act as intermediary nodes at all points in the 
network, and particularly at any integration or brokerage 
points. 
Not all computer systems however are the same from a 
security viewpoint.  We propose an overall trusted HIS 
architecture by which appropriate computer and network 
components may be evaluated and selected.  This is the 
fundamental concept of any architecture, namely the 
ability to select appropriate components or products so as 
to create a highly secure system overall.  The 
architectural work described in this paper presents such 
selection criteria. 
It has been long acknowledged that an application 
program can be no more secure than the software libraries 
and other subsystems it uses and depends upon.  These in 
turn can be no more secure than any “middleware” that 
they may use, nor the operating system upon which they 
depend.  Finally, all these depend upon the underlying 
hardware and firmware, including any driver and device 
support subsystems. In the creation of real healthcare 
related information systems, however, the question still 
arises of just where appropriate security, control and 
management (SCM) services and mechanisms should 
exist in these systems to provide overall information 
assurance. The question then devolves into a discussion 
on granularity and the “intelligence” that exists at each 
layer in a real system.  This has been a topic of research 
and discussion for well in excess of thirty years.  With the 
propagation of the “Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)” 
model in the early 1980s some formality entered that 
discussion.  The OSI seven-layer model is well known 
and acknowledged as a base for categorisation of cross 
computer platform services as shown in Table 1:  .  The 
top two layers, Layer 6: the “Presentation Layer” and 
Layer 7: the “Application Layer”, would appear to play a 
major role if more “fine-grained” levels of control are 
required, particularly in relation to HIS based around 
distributed computer systems.  For example, under OSI it 
was accepted that Layer 6 would provide the following 
services to an application sitting above it in Layer 7: 
• Data formatting – including translation between 
different character and even computer “word” 
coding schemes such as ASCII, EBCDIC, 
UniCode, “little-end” vs “big-end” addressing, 
etc.; encryption and decryption services at an 
appropriate level of granularity (“selective field 
encryption”); etc. 
• Provision of any compatibility requirements for 
the operating systems on the computers connected 
via the OSI scheme, and 
• Encapsulation of application level data into 
appropriate blocks needed for transmission. 
1.1 Security Goals for the Health Sector 
The security goals for the health sector incorporate data 
management and control as a fundamental requirement. 
Indeed it is the protection of so-called “data at rest” that 
may be considered, from experience over the last five 
years or so, to be the single major security factor in the 
protection of health information systems.  The issues of 
security and privacy of data in transit have been largely 
solved through the use of advanced cryptographic 
processes and procedures.  Factors such as cryptographic 
key management with associated data communications 
protocols and message formats, such as those involved in 
the widely used and accepted “link-level encryption” 
based Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)2/Transport Layer 
Security (TLS)3 scheme, have been incorporated into 
such processes.  These goals, for example, have been 
clearly defined in the statement of mission of Australia’s 
NEHTA4 as follows: 
• Improving the quality of healthcare services, by 
enabling authorised clinicians to access a patient's 
integrated healthcare information and history, directly 
sourced from clinical notes, test results and prescriptions 
using standardised clinical data formats and 
terminologies. 
• Streamlining multi-disciplinary care management, 
enabling seamless handovers of care by ensuring efficient 
electronic referrals; authorised access to up-to-date 
clinical opinions and patient healthcare histories via 
shared patient health records; and fast, secure 
mechanisms for directly exchanging important 
notifications between healthcare providers. 
• Improving clinical and administrative efficiency, by 
standardising certain types of healthcare information to 
be recorded in eHealth systems; uniquely identifying 
patients, healthcare providers and medical products; and 
reforming the purchasing process for medical products. 
• Maintaining high standards of patient privacy and 
information security. 
Requirements 1 and 4 of these NEHTA statements clearly 
emphasise the importance of creating a complete, usable 
and implementable security architecture for HIS on an 
end-to-end basis.  Moreover, NEHTA also recognises that 
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privacy perceptions of the Australian community play a 
major role in ensuring the success of e-health systems 
(NEHTA 2006). 
These factors are similarly emphasised in the USA 
through that country’s 1996 HIPAA (Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act), issued by the USA’s. 
Department of Health and Human Services (CMS 2004).  
The USA government intends to reform its national 
healthcare system with the goal of improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of healthcare operations 
whilst assuring that health information remains private 
and secure. Achieving the security goals for HIS is a 
critical factor in the successful implementation of e-
health initiatives.   
1.2 Scope and Assumptions 
The theme of this paper is in alignment with a number of 
specified topics within the scope of the conference 
including architecture of health information systems, 
privacy protection and the overall security/assurance of 
health systems.  Appropriate data security management 
involves the protection of such data in storage, during 
processing and when transmitted.  The proposed OTHIS 
structure addresses all of these areas.  This paper focuses 
on the security and protection of data in storage or under 
processing parts of the OTHIS overall structure. 
Our architecture assumes that the basic hardware and 
operating systems of all connected nodes in a healthcare 
information systems network are trusted and secure.  We 
submitted that any such computer systems participating in 
an HIS must conform to the “Labelled Security Protection 
Profile (LSPP)” of the internationally accepted 
information systems security evaluation standard, the 
Common Criteria (CC)5 under international standard IS 
15408.  Appropriately, the CC’s LSPP embraces both 
Mandatory Access Control and Discretionary Access 
Control policy rules and sets strict access limitations on 
both users and data objects.  In addition, a product or 
system meeting the LSPP provides better resistance to 
unauthorised access to the system from either internal or 
external parties.  MAC and DAC are described in later 
sections.  
Trust in network operations through health informatics 
network security (HINS) rests completely upon trust in 
health informatics application security (HIAS) and health 
informatics access control (HIAC), otherwise the security 
of messaging becomes futile.  These three aspects of the 
OTHIS philosophy are discussed later in this paper. The 
necessary messaging and network structures (HINS), as 
part of this overall OTHIS philosophy, are explored in 
forthcoming papers. 
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2 Related Work 
Web Services (WS) and Service-Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) concepts and implementations are proliferating.  
The WS application model promises to add functional 
and assessment complexities to the overall information 
assurance problem by weaving separate components 
together over the Internet to deliver application services 
through such methodologies as software “mashups” and 
the like.  These techniques place full trust in the 
underlying components that are combined into the overall 
system in a situation where the provenance of those 
underlying components may not be known.  
NEHTA recommends using an SOA approach to the 
design of healthcare application systems and the use of 
“Web Services” as the technology standards for 
implementing secure messaging systems (NEHTA 2005).  
NEHTA argues that development of information systems 
around WS technology is the direction in which the ICT 
industry is heading as well as being accepted as best 
practice for the design of scalable distributed systems 
today.  The SOA approach is claimed to lead to more 
reusable, adaptable and extensible systems over other 
techniques.  In particular, NEHTA supports the concept 
that WS technology has gained notable attention within 
the ICT industry and its use is extending in both 
popularity and market penetration. 
NEHTA work programs for an e-health interoperability 
framework include Clinical Information, Medicine 
Product Directory, Supply Chain Efficiency, eHealth 
Policy, Clinical Terminologies, Individual Healthcare 
Identifiers, Healthcare Provider Identifiers, Secure 
Messaging, User Authentication and Shared Electronic 
Health Record Specifications.  NEHTA focuses on 
exchanging clinical information by electronic means 
securely and reliably.  This may be achievable at the data 
communications link level by using secure messaging 
technology.  The fact is however that the associated and 
critical health information computer systems will be 
openly connected to the Internet, and thus be exposed to 
“cyber-attacks”.  This exposure has not been prevalent 
before.  In this Internet connectivity environment, the 
issues of data “at rest” and “under processing” within a 
specific operating system are far more critical, as is 
evidenced by any cursory examination of illicit 
penetration of computer systems connected to the Internet 
globally.  A complete architecture is needed, therefore, 
and not one that involves just a secure messaging system 
alone.  OTHIS addresses the privacy protection and 
security for health systems in a holistic and “end-to-end” 
manner.   
3 Our Approach 
3.1 Architectures of HIS 
A modern HIS architecture would normally consist of 
many subsidiary structures such as health application 
services, middleware-based functions, database 
management systems (DBMS), data network access and 
control systems, computer operating systems (OS) and 
hardware as shown as in Table 1:  .  Many application 
users wrongly believe that they have sophisticated 
security at that particular level since their applications 
provide a form of role-based access control or equivalent.  
It should be understood that no matter what security 
measures are supported at the application level they are 
only ever going to be superficial to the knowledgeable 
adversary or malicious insider. This approach has a 
significant limitation in that the overall application 
system can be no more secure than the software libraries 
invoked and incorporated into it as well as the underlying 
OS upon which the applications depend through such 
actions as systems calls, dynamic library activation, use 
of intermediate code interpreters, such as “JavaScript”, or 
“just-in-time (JIT)” compilers, etc.  The OS itself can be 
no more secure than the firmware and hardware facilities 
of the computer on which it operates.  Likewise, any 
other software component set, such as “middleware”, 
DBMS, network interface structure or “stack”, is 
constructed above the operating system and so totally 
depends upon security functions provided by the 
operating system as well as the robustness of that 
operating system against attack.   
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Table 1: TCP/IP Model, OSI Model and 
General HIS Architecture 
3.2 Open Trusted Health Informatics Scheme 
(OTHIS)  
To achieve a high level of information assurance in HIS, 
our research to date has indicated that an overall trusted 
HIS involves the definition of structures at a number of 
levels in computer hardware, OS design and facilities, 
data network control system and health service 
applications.  We propose a new approach to a more 
trusted structure, the Open Trusted Health Informatics 
Structure (OTHIS), with the aim of addressing privacy 
and security requirements in a holistic manner.  OTHIS 
defines privacy and security requirements at each level 
within a general HIS architecture to ensure the protection 
of data from both internal and external threats.  It is also 
aimed at providing conformance of any HIS to 
appropriate regulatory and legal requirements in 
Australia.  OTHIS is a broad architecture that can allow 
for different levels of abstraction depending upon what 
types of security services and mechanisms are required. 
The OSI reference model (ISO 7289-1) (Table 1: ) is 
well known and acknowledged as a baseline for 
categorisation of network communication functions and 
assessment.  In fact, a fully operational information 
system based on the full seven-layer OSI model, and its 
associated technical standards, never attained strong 
market acceptance.  The OSI model envisaged 
management and control facilities existing at each layer 
but many of the necessary full specifications and 
activities at each layer were never completed.  Instead, 
TCP/IP (Table 1: ) is the model normally used on a 
global basis for large scale structures in data network 
communications.  The TCP/IP model does not exactly 
match the OSI model.  The processes defined in the OSI 
model however are contained within the TCP/IP 
structures.  Normally HIS designs are based around 
distributed network systems and, therefore, it is entirely 
appropriate to relate the general HIS architecture to the 
OSI model as well as the TCP/IP model (Table 1).  Our 
research aims to relate and describe the roles and 
functions performed by each module of the OTHIS 
architecture and to detail how they fit into the layers of 
the OSI and TCP/IP models in a healthcare environment.   
It should be noted that the OSI model and HIS 
architecture can also be divided into software and 
hardware component categories.  From the point of view 
of this paper the first group, software system components, 
is addressed.  The interpretation of the requirements for 
appropriate levels of data granularity security in 
healthcare is the basis of this paper. 
Healthcare applications 
DBMS 
Middleware 
Data network management 
system 
Operating system 
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Figure 1: Open Trusted Health Informatics 
Scheme (OTHIS) 
OTHIS is a modularised architecture for HIS.  It can be 
clearly divided into separate and achievable function-
based modules, like modularity in the network system 
structure.  The advantages of the modularisation include 
the fact that each module is easier to manage and 
maintain.  One module can be changed without affecting 
the other module.  OTHIS is, thus, a broad architecture 
covering those requirements and parts that may be 
selected as required to meet particular circumstances.   
Any information system depends, fundamentally, upon a 
trusted base for safe and reliable operation, commonly 
referred to as a “trusted computing-base (TCB)”.  
Without a TCB any system is subject to compromise.  In 
particular, data security at the application level can be 
assured only when the healthcare application is operating 
on the top of the TCB platform.  Otherwise the adversary 
can exploit illicit means to perform the actions that 
bypass or disable the security features of healthcare 
applications or that grant inappropriate access privileges.  
Inevitably healthcare applications or databases must be 
executed the trusted platform to achieving adequate 
information assurance. OTHIS (Figure 1) is a broad 
structure that is aimed at running on top of trusted 
firmware and hardware bases.  OTHIS consists of three 
distinct modules: HIAC, HINS and HIAS.  There is some 
overlap with these three modules of the OTHIS; however, 
each module has a specific focus area (listed in Table 2).    
OTHIS Module Focus Information State 
Health Informatics Access 
Control (HIAC) 
Data 
centric 
Information at 
rest 
Health Informatics 
Application  Security 
(HIAS) 
Process 
centric 
Information under 
processing 
Health Informatics Network 
Security (HINS) 
Transfer 
centric 
Information under 
transfer 
Table 2: OTHIS Modules 
3.3 Health Informatics Access Control (HIAC) 
3.3.1 Access Control  
Access control is one of the fundamental security 
mechanisms used to protect computer resources, in 
particular in multi-user and resource-sharing computer 
based environments such as those incorporated into a 
contemporary HIS.  The lack of adequate access control 
and associated system management in health relevant 
computer systems has been demonstrated on numerous 
occasions in recent history, including the privacy invasion 
situation at Australia's Centrelink (Sharanahan and 
Karvelas 2006) , the lack of adequate safeguards in the 
UK NHS patient records system (Leigh and Evans 2006), 
and the significant IT security weaknesses identified in 
the US HHS information system (GAO 2006).  These 
types of information privacy violations or weaknesses 
have the potential for inflicting, and do inflict, major 
harm on HIS consumers and providers alike.  The issue of 
providing suitable computer OS access control in such 
systems is not an insurmountable one.  Indeed, 
appropriate computer-based access control schemes do 
exist and can be deployed to address these information 
security issues.  
Access control mechanisms, then, are used to define and 
then restrict users’ access to resources.  Organisations 
would normally use these controls to grant employees, for 
example, the authority to access only the information 
those users need to perform their duties, i.e. the principle 
of “least privilege”.  Access controls can limit the 
activities that an employee can perform on data at the 
level of granularity desired.  Access control mechanisms 
are therefore enabled at the OS level as well as higher 
levels including data network management and the 
database management systems for the application.   
The traditional approach to access control in computer 
systems has been bound up with the requirements at the 
OS level.  The 1983/1985 “Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)”6 or “Orange Book” first 
brought to the attention of both the commercial ICT 
industry itself and to users of IT products and services, 
the security needs at that level.  However, the level of 
granularity that applies at the OS level is aimed at the 
needs at that level for larger identified system 
components: data and executable program files, 
input/output devices, network components, software 
processes, threads, etc.  Discretionary access control 
(DAC) essentially assigned responsibility for all security 
parameters to the “owners” (users) of such larger entities, 
usually their creator, who could pass on such parameters 
to others and perform functions as desired.  Role based 
access control (RBAC) refined the concept to allow for 
users to be grouped into defined functions or “roles” 
allowing for far easier management of overall system 
security policy particularly in dynamic business 
environments.  Mandatory access control (MAC), 
originally designed to meet confidentiality requirements 
of military systems within rigid structures, allowed 
systems to be created that could, in principle, enforce 
security policy as set out by the overall enterprise and not 
set up by definition provided by file/program “owners”.   
The majority of current information systems are based 
around computer systems that implement the DAC 
concept. This is particularly true for commodity or 
“commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)” products and 
systems.  Examples of these computer systems include 
Microsoft Corporation’s “Windows” series of OS, open-
source systems such as “Linux” and the original Unix 
system.  These are general-purpose systems intended for 
use in as many applications as possible.   
In the healthcare sector, however, MAC-based systems 
are more appropriate to, and capable of, satisfying the 
specific requirements of privacy and security for 
information resources. Overall the MAC mechanism can, 
for example, provide the system with better protection 
from malicious or flawed applications, which can 
potentially damage or destroy the system and its 
information, and attacks from “insider” users.  It can also 
provide higher levels of protection against an external 
adversary penetrating the system by exploiting “Trojan 
Horse” type attacks, viruses, malware, spyware, root-kits, 
social engineering or other illicit means to gain total 
access control or to tamper with audit systems. 
3.3.2 Building in MAC, RBAC, DAC and 
others to HIAC 
ICT is now sufficiently advanced that a MAC-based 
electronic healthcare management system is feasible.   
OTHIS research to date has indicated that current OS 
structures need to be updated for HIS needs.  The Health 
Informatics Access Control (HIAC) model is our 
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approach to overcoming many of the privacy and security 
issues which have plagued previous attempts at electronic 
health management systems.  The HIAC model is 
necessarily MAC-based accompanied by RBAC 
administration properties for flexibility and a refined 
level of granularity.  This degree of simultaneous control 
and flexibility is not achievable with DAC, RBAC or 
MAC individually. 
For general applications, currently available products that 
support the MAC principles of a trusted OS include “Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Version 5”7, “Fedora Core 
6” and “Sun Microsystems Solaris 10 with Trusted 
Extensions Software”.  The first two of these incorporate 
the results of “Security Enhanced LINUX (SELinux)” 
research originally undertaken by the USA’s National 
Security Agency (NSA). It should be noted that while 
HIS appear to use earlier DAC-based systems, modern 
systems (as listed above) based around such MAC 
oriented OS, have obtained commercial reality as well as 
being evaluated under the internationally accepted 
Common Criteria. 
The HIAC model includes the principle of least privilege 
and also enforces domain separation through the use of 
the protected zones known as ‘sandboxes’ within 
Redhat’s RHEL version of SELinux.  These help prevent 
applications interfering with each other such that an 
unauthorised user cannot gain overall control of the 
system, as is possible with DAC. 
In general HIAC provides for maximum flexibility within 
a strongly secure environment. This means achieving a 
balance between security needs and flexibility of 
implementation. This balance is primarily determined 
from a risk assessment related to overall privacy 
imperatives.  For example, HIAC provides the flexibility 
of having an emergency override function by switching to 
a defined emergency policy or “profile”, in the terms used 
in the experimental system based on RHEL 4, in 
emergency circumstances.  Full, enforced auditing of the 
system deters potential abuses of this flexibility. 
To determine the practical viability of an HIAC model for 
HIS a demonstrator, based on an SELinux enhanced OS 
with MAC and RBAC approach (RHEL 4) was built 
(Henricksen et al. 2007).  The HIAC model exploits the 
privacy- and security-enhancement features of such 
trusted OS in the healthcare environment.  The end result 
is a dedicated trusted HIS which satisfies all privacy and 
security requirements. 
3.3.3 Granularity in the HIAC Model at the 
Application Level 
While privacy and security requirements directly relate to 
identifiable data and information, a far finer level of 
granularity is needed for security and control 
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management requirements of a real HIS.  In this regard, 
HIAC aims at addressing access control requirements in a 
holistic manner, capable of defining privacy and security 
requirements at higher layers in an HIS according to the 
broad OSI model shown in Table 1 and Figure 1.  
Within the HIAC structure, healthcare applications can be 
broadly placed into three classes.  These include: 
(a) healthcare applications that totally depend upon 
access control parameters and their enforcement at 
the higher abstraction level of a computer/network 
operating system;  
(b) healthcare applications which provide access 
control definition, functionality and enforcement 
for an overall, enterprise-defined set of data access 
and program activation rules within the application 
programming code; and   
(c) healthcare applications which depend upon access 
control definition, functionality and enforcement 
on the database management system used to 
maintain necessary healthcare databases, i.e. the 
data accessibility at table/view level, row/column 
level and cell-level in databases. 
The healthcare application of type (a) provides only to a 
certain level of granularity where it enforces access 
controls on files and file directories within the trusted OS 
level, but it does not provide access controls at 
table/view, row/column and cell level in the database. 
The healthcare application of type (b) must be tested and 
evaluated against mandatory healthcare information 
protection requirements. This may involve analysis of 
detailed legal and regulatory requirements at the 
application designer level. Any information assurance 
requirements imposed upon the application must be 
reliably enforced.  Such enforcement must be capable of a 
high level of trust.  This type of structure can be costly 
and difficult to maintain without associated or 
complementary information assurance management 
applications.  In many cases this means that multiple 
trusted application programs need to be created where 
appropriate levels of security functionality are entrusted 
to each program component.   
In reducing the maintenance cost by managing security at 
the application level, the healthcare application of type 
(c) combines such structures with the finer levels of 
granularity needed for both data and processes relevant to 
the healthcare sector.  In fact a number of relational 
database vendors, such as IBM, Oracle and Microsoft, 
offer access control techniques at table/view, row/column 
and cell level to restrict data accessibility in relational 
databases to a finer degree of granularity.  These 
techniques include encryption processes at the associated 
levels of granularity.   
The ability to achieve finer granular levels of access 
control at table/view, row/column and cell levels on the 
health records is achieved by the typical approach of 
adding security labelling rows to the database.  A label is 
used to describe the sensitivity of an object or the 
permissions of a subject (e.g. users or processes).  A 
subject can access an object if the subject’s clearance 
level dominates the security level of the object.  This 
exemplifies the MAC policy where the overriding 
information access rule is based on a concept of 
“clearances” for users and “classification” for 
information, both defined by the owner of the information 
system and not by its users or developers.  Access 
permissions are determined by a user’s clearance 
compared with the sensitivity or classification level label 
on information stored in the system.   
Patient 
name 
Sex … Permanent  
Disability 
Powers of 
Attorney 
Vi Lee F … Macular degeneration (encrypted) 
Lu Ho M … (encrypted) liver donation 
Table 3: Example of encrypted data elements in a 
patient record  
As illustrated in Table 2, it is possible that data may need 
control at a finer level than that of the entire row in a 
table in the database.  Microsoft (Rask et al. 2005) 
provides a security technique by using an encryption 
mechanism to restrict access to any arbitrary data element 
at the cell-level within the database. 
3.3.4 Backup and Audit Trail in the HIAC 
Model 
Audit trails could be capable of efficient information 
policy assurance implementation by application of the 
three types of health applications within the HIAC 
structure as outlined in Section 3.3.3, that is security 
through access control delegated to the level of the 
trusted operating system capable of enforcing MAC 
profiles.  The HIAC architecture enables the adoption of 
only those security services and methods necessary for 
the appropriate level of assurance in each case.  In the 
case of an audit trail, HIAC at the OS level may be 
sufficient. An additional encryption method may, 
however, need to be invoked to protect audit trail 
information when in backup or transmitted form.   
Backup structures could similarly depend for security 
functionality and enforcement on the type of healthcare 
applications within the HIAC structure, that is security 
functionality definition enforcement at a higher OS level 
of abstraction as for audit trails.  In particular, the 
protection of audit trails and backup may rely on the 
security features and enforcement of the trusted OS to 
have sufficient protection. 
HIAC involves a combination of all three broad structures 
of healthcare applications mention above.  It goes further, 
however, in that it incorporates necessary and appropriate 
security mechanisms where these are required, for 
example the use of encryption at the table, data record 
and/or data element (cell) level.  This research aims at a 
structure and method for the definition of appropriate 
locations for the insertion of necessary security 
mechanisms within an overall HIS, as envisaged in the 
original open systems interconnection security 
architecture through standards ISO 7498-28 and ISO/IEC 
7498-49. It should be noted that these security 
architecture standards (ISO 7498-2 and ISO/IEC 7498-4) 
identified necessary security services and mechanisms as 
well as their management along with the appropriate 
point or location of such mechanisms and services within 
an overall OSI architecture. This research adopts the 
broad architectural concepts as proposed in those 
standards and as adopted for some time by national 
governments via “Government OSI Profiles (GOSIP)”. 
The HIAC architecture envisages that legacy systems will 
need to be incorporated into more modern HIS.  This is 
allowed for by the ability of HIAC to cater for different 
levels of information granularity.  Overall management of 
HIAC structure systems will require the clear design and 
deployment of associated security management 
structures. The encryption methods used, for example, 
require an associated cryptographic key management 
facility operating at whatever level of granularity is 
required in a particular HIS, for example at the data 
element, database table, file, network connection “port” 
level.  This overall HIAC management architecture is the 
basis of a further research paper.   
3.4 Health Informatics Application Security 
(HIAS) 
Legislation, regulation and enterprise policy in relation to 
privacy and security in health informatics normally 
involves specific data entities (such as service provider, 
patient identity, etc.) rather than higher level information 
technology constructs.  Such data entities, however, must 
themselves exist within those same larger constructs (e.g. 
databases, messaging systems, operating system file 
structures and the like). While privacy and security 
requirements directly relate to identifiable data and 
information, those HIS elements sitting at higher level 
information system layers cannot be ignored.   
The overall aim of the HIAS model is to address the data 
protection requirements reflected in such regulatory 
instruments with the practical security services and 
mechanisms provided by healthcare application systems.  
In this regard, HIAS aims at defining privacy and security 
requirements at the application level in an HIS according 
to the OSI model shown in Table 1.  HIAC and HINS 
provides the security services that HIAS needs through 
the authentication of claimed identities throughout HIS 
following by the adequate access control management.   
HIAS is located at the OSI’s “Application Layer”, Layer 
7, to provide security features which are often required by 
a healthcare application at a data element level through to 
a service level. 
                                                           
8 ISO 7498-2:1989 Information processing systems – Open 
Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model – Part 2: 
Security Architecture, functions as a discipline to identify 
services and mechanisms should be placed in the security 
architecture.   
9 ISO/IEC ISO 7498-4:1989 Information processing systems – 
Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model – Part 
4: Management framework. 
One of the benefits of an integrated, readily accessible, 
electronic health record system is that it can facilitate 
healthcare information exchange between healthcare 
providers. Healthcare providers may use different 
healthcare applications from multiple vendors with 
various information formats and, thus, the exchange of 
clinical information between disparate HIS can be 
impeded.  In order to allow different HIS to effectively 
and securely communicate with one another, healthcare 
information must be sent using a consistent standard or 
protocol to improve compatibility and interoperability 
among a variety of healthcare applications and systems. 
NEHTA argues WS as the most appropriate mechanism 
to support secure messaging between participants in the 
healthcare sector (NEHTA 2006).  The WS technology 
can incorporate security features in the application layer, 
i.e. “WS-Security”, in the header of a “Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP)”10  XML message.  WS-
Security provides a set of mechanisms to maintain finer 
granular levels of security services, such as 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-
repudiation at an element level.  For example, WS-
security defines how to use XML Encryption and XML 
Signature processes in the SOAP to secure message 
exchanges (Buecker et al. 2007) .   Moreover, WS is a 
series of open standards intended to support 
interoperability in an environment where separate 
applications need to share information over an open 
network.  This, however, provides end-to-end security for 
data and messages in transit but depends upon underlying 
processes as described above.   
OTHIS must cater for the situation where WS structures 
are being used as the major health informatics 
information transport methodology.  OTHIS recognises 
that the SOA approach, implemented through a WS 
structure, has become a major information architecture 
paradigm.  As such, any healthcare security architecture 
must be capable of handling the WS paradigm in a 
trusted, secure and efficient manner. 
3.4.1 HL7 and Secure Inter-application 
Messaging  
Health Level 7 (HL7), an American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI) accredited standard, has been developed 
to enable disparate healthcare applications to exchange 
key sets of clinical and administrative data.  With respect 
to the HL7 structure, HIAS depends upon the use of 
cryptographic subsystems as its security mechanism. 
In developing a trusted system architecture for an HIS, it 
is important to understand the philosophy of HL7 for 
medical data transfer.  Future research programs under 
OTHIS will elucidate the relationships between the broad 
HL7 structure and that of OTHIS from an information 
assurance perspective.  In particular, the focus is on the 
use of HL7 for both communication and application 
security and privacy services are needed. 
                                                           
10 SOAP, platform independent protocol, normally uses 
HTTP/HTTPS as the mechanisms for exchanging XML-based 
messages over networks.   
It is necessary to determine just what parts of the HL7 
standards set belong to either of, or both, HIAC and 
HIAS.  The problem of secure messaging structures, 
however, belongs to the HINS component, as described in 
a forthcoming paper.  For example, HL7 requires the use 
of “digital signatures”.  Reliable digital signatures are 
expected to be created from subsystems within the 
computer OS, and also possibly specific computer 
hardware under which the HIS works.  Without a trusted 
foundation, the data security of any health applications 
must be vulnerable.   
3.5 Health Informatics Network Security 
(HINS) 
HINS consists of the appropriate network level security 
structure within an underlying HIS. HINS is aimed at the 
provision of services and mechanisms to authenticate 
claims of identity, to provide appropriate authorisations 
(least privileges) following authentication, to prevent 
unauthorised access to shared health data, to protect the 
network from attacks and to provide secure 
communications health data transmission over the 
associated data networks.   
The major function of HINS is the authentication of 
claimed identities throughout a healthcare information 
system, including not only all personnel but also all 
computing, data storage and computer peripherals such as 
printers, scanners and network interfaces.  Such 
authentication extends not only to the individual claimed 
identity, but to its authorised function.  For example, a 
printer unit in a pharmacy or dispensary area in a hospital 
is an important component in an overall HIS since it may 
be used to print  prescriptions from medical staff, labels 
for medication containers incorporating pharmaceutical 
identities and required dosage/usage, etc. Such an 
activity, for example, may be mandatorily associated with 
this printer element and no other.  As outlined earlier, 
once a claimed identity has been authenticated, 
appropriate authorisations may be activated through 
HIAC components.  In this sense, authorisation is 
separate from authentication. The OTHIS structure allows 
for such authorisations to be separated, identified, defined 
and enforced.   
HINS involves the vital integration of network security 
protocols and associated data formats with the access 
control structures contained within an OS and allied 
generic application systems of individual computer 
nodes.  In the generic sense this need for efficient, 
reliable and trusted integration is exemplified by the 
Cisco and Microsoft NAC/NAP11  proprietary security 
structure.  HINS has, as an overall aim, the extension of 
                                                           
11 NAC/NAP is a Microsoft and Cisco’s joint structure for 
Microsoft Network Access Protection (NAP) and Cisco 
Network Admission Control (NAC) interoperability.  Microsoft 
NAP is a policy enforcement platform incorporate into 
Windows Vista and Windows Server Longhorn.  Cisco NAC 
consists of a set of mechanisms developed into Cisco’s 
networking infrastructure 
http://blogs.msdn.com/windowsvistasecurity/archive/2006/09/0
6/742775.aspx accessed 27/04/07. 
such NAC/NAP architecture to the requirements of 
healthcare applications themselves, usually based upon 
large database management systems. 
4 Conclusion and Future Work 
In conclusion, the overall HIS architecture must evolve 
into a set of complementary security architectures which, 
at least, incorporates those proposed under the OTHIS 
scheme consisting of HIAC, HIAS and HINS.  This 
proposed OTHIS scheme will be tested through 
experimental structures created on an SELinux-based 
computer platform. Key research questions to be 
answered include those concerning both system 
efficiency and availability aspects of the proposed 
architecture.   This paper presents a broad architecture for 
high-trust HIS based around the concepts of “mandatory 
access control”.  Preliminary results of this research 
indicate that the broad philosophy of MAC appears 
ideally suited to the protection of the healthcare 
information systems environment.  The reasons for this 
may be summarised as follows: 
1. Not all people and sub-systems involved in an 
overall system operate at the same level of 
security and trust. 
2. People have different roles depending upon their 
function. Those functions depend upon factors 
such as qualification levels, experience and legal 
responsibilities.  
3. The healthcare environment is rapidly moving to 
the use of commercial COTS systems 
interconnected via the global open Internet. As 
such, MAC philosophies are essential to 
safeguard the individual computer node points 
and thus all transmission paths for electronic 
health records   
The aim of this research paper has been to re-examine 
and re-evaluate MAC philosophies in the light of (a) 
current requirements such as those for an HIS and (b) the 
current ICT product and systems environment.  This 
research re-evaluates MAC under the OTHIS structure 
from the viewpoints set out above.  More than two 
decades ago the MAC mechanism was introduced to 
commercial systems in order to reliably define and then 
restrict access to computer resources.  OTHIS, while 
proposing underlying access control structures based 
around the broad principles of early MAC structures, 
aims at re-evaluating those MAC structures against the 
healthcare informatics environment and the universal 
usage of commodity ICT products and systems.  HIAC 
aims at combining such structures with the higher levels 
of granularity needed for both data and processes relevant 
to the healthcare sector. 
This paper contends that it is both timely and desirable to 
move electronic HIS towards privacy- and security-aware 
applications that reside atop trusted computing-based OS 
structures.  Such systems have the real-world potential to 
satisfy all stakeholder requirements including modern 
information structures, organizational policies, legislative 
and regulatory requirements for both healthcare providers 
and healthcare consumers (privacy and security), and 
flexible operational demands in a modern HIS.   
This paper emphasises the need for well-directed research 
into the application of security-enhanced operating 
systems to provide a viable, real-world trusted HIS.   
5 References 
Buecker, A., Ashley, P., Bouyssou, J., Gargaro, G., 
Muppidi, S., Neucom, R., Readshaw, N. and Schinke, 
G. (2007): Understanding SOA Security Design and 
Implementation, IBM Corp. 
HIPAA Security Series, CMS 
http:://www.cms.hhs.gov/EducationMaterials/04_Secur
ityMaterials.asp#TopOfPage. Accessed 22/05/2006.  
Information Security: Department of Health and Human 
Services Needs to Fully Implement Its Program, GAO 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06267.pdf. Accessed 
20/11/2006.  
Graauw, M. d. (2005): Implementing Web Services in 
Dutch Healthcare. 
http://www.ringholm.de/docs/03030_en.htm. Accessed 
22/08/2007. 
Henricksen, M., Caelli, W. and Croll, P. R. (2007): 
Securing Grid Data Using Mandatory Access Controls. 
5th Australian Symposium on Grid Computing and e-
Research (AusGrid 2007), Ballarat Australia. 
Warning over privacy of 50m patient files (2006): Leigh, 
D. and Evans, R.  
http://society.guardian.co.uk/health/news/0,,1936403,0
0.html. Accessed 01/11/2006. 
NEHTA (2005): Towards a Secure Messaging 
Environment. 
www.nehta.gov.au/index.php?option=com_docman&ta
sk=doc_download&gid=63&Itemid=139 Accessed 
22/08/2007. 
NEHTA (2006): Privacy Blueprint - Unique Healthcare 
Identifiers. 
http://www.nehta.gov.au/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&task=view&id=163&Itemid=144. Accessed 
19/08/2007. 
NEHTA (2006): Towards a Secure Messaging 
Environment 
www.nehta.gov.au/index.php?option=com_docman&ta
sk=doc_download&gid=63&Itemid=139. Accessed 
6/09/2007. 
Implementing Row- and Cell-Level Security in Classified 
Databases Using SQL Server 2005, Rask, A., Rubin, D. 
and Neumann, b. 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/sql/200
5/multisec.mspx. Accessed 15/08/2007.  
Welfare workers axed for spying (2006): Sharanahan, D. 
and Karvelas, P.  
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,2
0223075-601,00.html. Accessed 27/11/2006. 
 
 
